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Opposition Support and the Experience of 
Violence Explain Colombian Peace  
Referendum Results 
Eleonora Dávalos, Leonardo Fabio Morales, Jennifer S. 
Holmes, and Liliana M. Dávalos 
Abstract: What factors led to the surprise defeat of the Colombian peace 
referendum? Initial analyses suggested a link between support for peace 
and the experience of violence, but economic conditions and political 
support for incumbent parties also affect electoral outcomes. We use 
Bayesian hierarchical models to test links between referendum result and 
previous violence victimization, economic conditions, and support for 
Centro Democrático (the main party opposed to the peace agreement). 
There was less support for peace in the Andean region than in other 
regions, and departments with lower support had higher unemployment 
and growth in GDP. Support for the opposition was the dominant co-
variate of decreasing support for the peace accords, while previous vio-
lence victimization increased the proportion of votes for peace. In light 
of these results, regional variation in baseline support for the agreements 
– a complex variable governed by partisan engagement but also influ-
enced by structural economic factors – will be critical during implemen-
tation of the newly revised accords. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Implications of the 2016 Colombian Referendum 
Throughout 2016, talk of post-conflict became common throughout 
Colombia. After four years of peace talks, the government and the 
FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) agreed to end 
their conflict that had started in 1964. On 2 October 2016, Colombian 
voters went to the polls for a referendum on a peace deal negotiated by 
the FARC and President Juan Manuel Santos. Despite projections of a 
“yes” vote on the referendum, a slim majority (50.2 percent) rejected the 
peace deal with the FARC. The “No” campaign was led by former presi-
dent Álvaro Uribe and his Centro Democrático party, who criticized the 
deal for being too lenient on the FARC, being too financially generous to 
demobilized rebels, and providing guarantees of representation in Con-
gress through 2022. Why did the “no” side win? Was it a reflection of 
President Santos’ low approval rate? Does it portend growing support 
for the main opposition party, led by former President Uribe? Does it 
undermine prospects for peace in Colombia? So far, descriptive analyses 
or media-based speculation have dominated the answers to these urgent 
questions. At least two theoretical approaches are relevant to this case; 
one studies the inclusion or exclusion of civil society in the peace pro-
cess, and another focuses on referendum results. While the civil society 
and peace process literature sets positive expectations for the referen-
dum results, the referendum literature is guarded, at best. 
1.2 Peace Talks, Civil Society and Legitimacy 
There is a large literature debating the efficacy of the inclusion of civil 
society in peace negotiations. Despite the increased complications that 
can arise from additional parties in peace negotiations, scholars such as 
Aall (2007), Belloni (2001), Orjuela (2003), and Paffenholz (2010) have 
argued for the inclusion of civil society in peace processes. The ad-
vantages of this approach to negotiations are not limited to the agree-
ments among parties. Instead, cross-national analyses find that inclusion 
boosts the perceived legitimacy of the peace process leading to more 
durable peace (Nilsson 2012; Wanis-St. John 2008; Zanker 2014). How-
ever, the specific mechanisms translating inclusion to legitimacy remain 
unclear. For example, there was no increased support for the peace 
agreement among university students in Cyprus in an experimental study 
analyzing the inclusion of civil society (Kanol 2015). Nevertheless, inclu-
sion takes many forms, and the specifics of civil society inclusion matter 
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(Paffenholz 2014). This is why Paffenholz (2014) encouraged scholars to 
focus on particular characteristics, as she has identified nine models of 
civil society inclusion.  
The 2016 Colombian case can be considered unusual. Although the 
peace negotiations were initially held between the Colombian govern-
ment and the FARC, midway through the talks, the United Nations and 
Universidad Nacional de Colombia convened five national forums to 
obtain civil society input to be presented to the negotiators in Havana. 
Moreover, certain victim groups, including women, indigenous and Afro 
Colombian representatives, were invited to contribute. In an attempt to 
maintain support of the armed forces, respected retired military officers 
also participated. The last point of the agreement called for a democratic 
mechanism that was initially designed as a referendum. The referendum 
organization did have broad participation, with 1842 committees regis-
tered with the National Election Council (1676 in favor and 166 against; 
see Gomez-Suarez 2017). Overall, there was substantial civil society 
participation, and attention to victims in particular, which is generally 
expected to increase support for a peace process. 
1.3  Referenda 
Referenda are relatively uncommon and results may be driven by the 
salient policy issues, but also by support for the incumbent or opposi-
tion, and in response to economic performance. For example, a weak 
economy and the power of Euroskeptic parties played a role in the 
French rejection of the European constitution (Jérôme and Vaillant 
2005), but support for the president also minimized the loss among 
center-right parties (Brouard and Tiberj 2006). In the case of the 1992 
Danish EU referendum, as in Colombia, the intention to put the issue 
before a popular vote was seen as more democratic, but the risk of plac-
ing a major foreign policy issue (in Denmark) or a major domestic policy 
issue (in the Colombian case) before ordinary voters lies in the public’s 
lack of interest and information (Siune and Svensson 1993). Hence, 
referenda have been cited as both ways to strengthen democracy and 
accountability (Barczak 2001), or to outmaneuver opposition forces 
through decrees and popular referenda (Breuer 2009). In Latin America, 
referenda tend to be related to institutional reform (Altman 2014).  
The Colombian referendum was initiated by Colombian President 
Juan Manuel Santos to legitimize the peace treaty and isolate the agree-
ments from subsequent political debates, and was therefore a proactive 
referendum (Breuer 2009). Further, the decision to hold a referendum is 
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framed by a general decline in support for Colombian political parties 
(Holmes and Gutiérrez De Piñeres 2012). The referendum was an at-
tempt to legitimate both the president and his agenda and was not just a 
means to obtain a popular vote on a specific decision (Breuer 2007). 
Although Santos had won re-election in the second round with almost 
51 percent of the vote in 2014, the closeness of the results meant that 
Santos had to look for support among other parties to create a governing 
coalition. His rival, Óscar Iván Zuluaga, of Uribe’s Centro Democrático 
party, had received 45 percent of the vote in the second round.  
Power is fragmented in the both the House and in Senate. The Sen-
ate has 102 members, but there is no majority party. Instead, major par-
ties include the Partido de la U party, which has 21 seats, followed by the 
Centro Democrático with 20, the Partido Conservador (18), the Partido 
Liberal (17), the Partido Cambio Radical (nine), and the Partido Alianza 
Verde, the Polo Democrático Alternativo, and the Partido Opción Ciu-
dadana, all of which have five seats. The House contains 166 members 
and is similarly divided. The Partido Liberal holds 39 seats, the Partido 
de la U has 37 seats, the Partido Conservador 27, the Centro Democráti-
co 19, and the Partido Cambio Radical 16. The Partido Alianza Verde 
and the Partido Opción Ciudadana each have six seats. Numerous other 
small parties had some representation (Polo Democrático Alternativo 
and El Mira had three each, in addition to others, see El Tiempo 2014). 
Prior to the referendum, there were early warning signs for support 
of the peace process. Santos’ declining popularity had a negative impact 
on support for the peace process. Based on public opinion polls in 2014 
and 2015, Carlin, McCoy, and Subotic (2016) found that trust in Presi-
dent Santos was one of the largest indicators of support for the peace 
process. As Santos’ popularity waned, this linkage was going to drag 
down support for the peace process. Moreover, previous polls (e.g., 
Montoya 2014; Rodríguez 2012) documented general support for a peace 
process, but little support for the FARC participating as a political party 
and a lingering skepticism about FARC’s true motivation of peace. At 
the time of the referendum in October 2016, Santos’ approval had fallen 
to a low of 29 percent. His 2014 rival, Zuluaga, had an approval rating of 
34 percent, and former President Uribe, who took a hard line against the 
FARC and was a strident opponent of peace talks, was most popular 
with a 52 percent approval rating. Uribe and his Centro Democrático led 
the effort for the “no” vote in the referendum.  
Of course, economic performance factors also have a major impact 
in elections (Lewis-Beck 2008), including referenda. In the case of the 
1988 Chilean election, economic performance in terms of income, un-
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employment, and inflation influenced the referendum on Pinochet 
(Panzer and Paredes 1991). According to Gallup, by late fall 2016, the 
Colombian public was increasingly frustrated with corruption, poor eco-
nomic performance, unemployment, and inflation (Gallup 2016a), creat-
ing a negative context for the referendum. 
Historically, security has also been a major concern in Colombia. 
However, for the first time since May 2011, security was not consistently 
one of the top two concerns of Colombians in the six months leading up 
to the referendum (Gallup 2016b). Security concerns have been noted as 
important performance issues in explaining electoral outcomes elsewhere 
(Arce 2003; Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin, and Mierau 2008; Holmes and Gu-
tiérrez De Piñeres 2012; Kelly 2003). However, this referendum raised 
hopes of ending a conflict with FARC that had plagued Colombia since 
1964.  
Based on the referendum literature, a number of factors favored the 
“no” side. First, there is a “status quo bias”, also known as LeDuc’s Law, 
in which voters tend to support the status quo at the ballot box, despite 
possibly expressing support for change earlier in polls (LeDuc 2003). 
Indecision and uncertainty translate into support for the status quo, in 
this case, continued conflict in Colombia and a rejection of the peace 
process. Second, uncertainty about outcomes favors the default (Bowler 
and Donovan 1998), in this case the “no” vote. Third, thanks to repeated 
referenda in the state of California, it is possible to analyze how cam-
paign spending affects results (Bowler 2015). Campaign spending to 
support the “no” side can be more powerful than the “yes” – strong 
enough to play a veto role but not strong enough to generate a legislative 
solution (Bowler 2015). Finally, a similar asymmetry favoring “no” votes 
emerges in campaigning and messaging (Vreese 2006), as it is more diffi-
cult to defend a yes vote and easy to attack it. In a partisan setting, politi-
cal parties generally have a hard time sending consistent messages despite 
a dichotomous yes/no choice (Vreese 2006). These dynamics, which bias 
strongly toward “no” votes, are more powerful in countries where voters 
have relatively little experience with referenda, and Colombia had not 
held a referendum since its constitutional referendum in 2003. Partisan 
education and messaging become critical, but large, centrist parties have 
the most difficulty maintaining coherent support for referenda (Vreese 
2006). In short, the referendum literature provided a more pessimistic 
assessment for the Colombian referendum. 
The outcome surprised both the poll-based predictions and the 
government that called for it. Here, we analyze the outcome of the 
referendum to evaluate the relationship between the vote and a series of 
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potential covariates, including economic, electoral, and conflict-related 
variables. To adequately model data collected at a larger geographic scale, 
we use a hierarchical approach, enabling sampling of unemployment, 
economic growth, and inflation. The results highlight the importance of 
controlling for economic trends when accounting for electoral outcomes. 
2 Materials and Methods 
2.1 Data 
A series of socioeconomic variables have been generally found to predict 
election outcomes. These variables include: support for the opposition in 
previous elections, gross domestic product (GDP) growth, and rates of 
unemployment and inflation. As the goal of this study is to identify and 
measure the relationship between exposure to violence and the referen-
dum on the peace agreement, we included two variables to capture this 
association: the cumulative number of victims (2001–2010), and the 
cumulative arrivals of displaced persons for the 1984–2016 period (the 
modal year of arrival is 2000). These last two variables were divided by 
the 2005 census population to produce per-capita indicators (Brouard 
and Tiberj 2006; DANE 2008), and the resulting ratio was log10-
transformed. Our final sample consists of 860 municipalities in Colom-
bia as of 2016. In a simple linear model, the highest variance inflation 
factor (VIF) is 1.51, suggesting that multicollinearity is not an issue 
(Kennedy 2008).2 Table 1 summarizes the response and predictor varia-
bles, along with their geographic scales and original sources. 
Table 1. Variables, Geographic Scale, and Data Sources Used in the 
Model  
Variable Scale Source 
Percent referen-
dum approval 
Municipality Registraduría Nacional de Colombia 
Population 2005 
census 
Municipality Carillo (2009) 
                                                 
2  As part of the exploratory stage, we calculated a correlation matrix for all the 
variables included in the analysis. We also ran a simple regression model and 
performed a variance inflation factor (VIF) to detect any possible issue of an 
excess of linear correlation among explanatory variables. In general, no single 
correlation between a pair of independent variables is particularly high. In addi-
tion, the highest VIF is 1.51, which suggest that there is no problem of excess 
of correlation (the standard sing of multicollinearity is a VIF greater than 10). 
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Variable Scale Source 
Displaced arrivals 
cumulative 1984–
2016 
Municipality Registro Único de Víctimas (RUV) 
Victims of violence 
cumulative 2001–
2010 
Municipality Human Rights and Political Violence 
Database -CINEP- 
(http://www.nocheyniebla.org) 
Support for Centro 
Democrático 2014 
Municipality Registraduría Nacional de Colombia 
Unemployment 
2015 
Departamento Colombian Household Survey (GEIH-
DANE) 
GDP growth 
2013–2014 
Departamento DANE 
Inflation 2015 Departamento DANE 
Note:  GDP = gross domestic product. 
2.2 Modeling Approach 
While referendum outcome and violence data were available by munici-
palities, data on GDP and unemployment and inflation rates were availa-
ble only at the aggregate department scale (that is, each department con-
tains many municipalities). Therefore, we used a hierarchical Bayesian 
approach to model approval for the peace treaty (percentage) as a func-
tion of the predictor variables. In particular: 
 
   	
 	 	 
 
in which i designates each municipality and j each department, y is the 
percentage approval for the treaty at the municipal scale modeled as a 
normally-distributed variable with precision given as a function of its 
standard deviation y,  specifies different intercepts for departments, 
and separate coefficients  capture the effect of each predictor. In turn, 
 is normally distributed, and centered on  with standard deviation 
given by a and determined by: 
 
    	 	 !"#$ 	%& 
 
in which the intercept of each department is a normally-distributed vari-
able with precision given as a function of its standard deviation a, and 
determined by variables observed at the department level. We compared a 
model including all predictors with one that excluded inflation and found 
that the simplest model lacked both inflation and the arrival of displaced 
persons as explanatory variables.  
  Colombian Peace Referendum Results 107
 

 
To estimate measures of variance explained at both hierarchical lev-
els – observations y and departments a – we calculated errors at each of 
these levels of inference and estimated the variance explained and level 
of pooling in each case (Gelman and Pardoe 2006). Bayesian models 
were run in R2jags (Su and Yajima 2012) on the R v3.1.4 (R Dev-
elopment Core Team 2005) platform and were implemented in JAGS 
(Plummer 2003). Each model ran four chains of 5000 generations each. 
Posterior estimates were obtained after discarding the first half of all 
chains as burn-in, and thinning chains every other sample. To assess 
convergence, we used the Gelman-Rubin diagnostic (< 1.05) and effec-
tive sample size for all parameters 1000. The Gelman-Rubin diagnostic, 
or potential scale reduction factor (Gelman and Rubin 1992), approaches 
1.00 as chains converge on the same estimates for a given parameter by 
comparing within-chain variance to the between-chain variance. The best 
model was selected by maximizing the variance explained for both ob-
servations y and departments a. 
3 Results 
The model with all predictors had the highest proportion of variance 
explained (Table 2). This model fitted different intercepts for each de-
partment summarized in Table 3. These department-specific intercepts 
indicate baseline support for the peace agreement before accounting for 
all predictors, with the lowest estimates for Quindio with a mean of 76 
(95 percent HPD = 70–82), and the highest estimates for Chocó with a 
mean of 106 (95 percent HPD = 102–110). Two predictor variables, 
displaced arrivals and inflation, had coefficients with high probability 
densities including 0, consistent with or without detectable effect. All 
other predictors contributed to explaining the variance in the response, 
with the indicator of victims of violence strongly increasing support for 
the peace agreement, and support for the Centro Democrático party in 
the previous presidential elections strongly decreasing support for the 
peace accords (Figure 2). At the department scale, unemployment and 
GDP growth both decreased support for the accords, although not as 
strongly as the municipality-level factors (Figure 3). 
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Table 2. Models Considered 
Model R2 munic-
ipalities 
R2 depart-
ments 
Pooling 
factor mu-
nicipalities 
Pooling 
factor de-
partments 
All predictors  
N = 860, J = 24 0.77 0.33 0.03 0.24 
No inflation  
N = 907, J = 32 0.77 0.21 0.03 0.25 
No displaced and 
no inflation  
N = 907, J = 32 
0.77 0.21 0.03 0.25 
Note:  Variance explained by Bayesian models at each hierarchical level, and pooling 
factors for the observations. The pooling factor ranges from 0–-1, with 0 indi-
cating no pooling of estimates toward a population mean, while 1 indicates 
complete pooling of estimates. Pooling factors <0.5 indicate more within-group 
than population-level information (Siune and Svensson 1993). J = sample of 
departments, N = sample of municipalities. 
Table 3. Intercepts for Each Department 
Parameter Mean  2.50% 
HPD 
Medi-
an 
97.50% 
HPD 
PSRF ESS 
Antioquia 80.9 1.76 77.5 81.0 84.4 1.001 2800 
Atlantico 85.9 2.34 81.3 85.9 90.5 1.002 1400 
Bogota, D.C. 86.8 5.07 76.8 86.8 96.8 1.001 3400 
Bolivar 95.3 1.95 91.4 95.3 99.0 1.001 3400 
Boyaca 91.2 2.11 87.1 91.2 95.4 1.001 3900 
Caldas 82.9 2.34 78.4 82.9 87.5 1.002 2200 
Caqueta 87.3 2.44 82.5 87.3 92.1 1.001 4300 
Cauca 90.1 1.73 86.7 90.1 93.6 1.001 3500 
Cesar 81.0 2.16 76.9 81.0 85.3 1.002 2400 
Cordoba 91.1 2.09 86.9 91.0 95.2 1.001 5000 
Cundina-
marca 85.9 2.10 81.9 85.9 90.0 1.001 4000 
Choco 105.2 2.05 101.2 105.3 109.2 1.001 5000 
Huila 87.1 2.28 82.6 87.0 91.5 1.001 3800 
La Guajira 85.4 2.50 80.5 85.5 90.2 1.001 5000 
Magdalena 93.4 2.12 89.2 93.4 97.6 1.001 5000 
Meta 85.4 2.19 81.1 85.4 89.8 1.001 5000 
Nariño 92.2 1.79 88.7 92.2 95.8 1.001 3200 
Norte de 
Santander 76.4 2.01 72.3 76.4 80.2 1.001 5000 
Quindio 76.1 2.78 70.5 76.1 81.6 1.002 2000 
Risaralda 83.6 2.61 78.4 83.6 88.7 1.001 4000 
Santander 85.2 1.94 81.4 85.2 89.0 1.002 2600 
Sucre 92.6 2.13 88.4 92.5 96.7 1.001 4700 
Tolima 83.5 2.05 79.5 83.5 87.4 1.003 1400 
Valle del 
Cauca 78.7 2.05 74.7 78.8 82.8 1.002 2600 
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Parameter Mean  2.50% 
HPD 
Medi-
an 
97.50% 
HPD 
PSRF ESS 
displaced 0.270 0.750 -1.169 0.254 1.762 1.001 5000 
victims 2.289 0.506 1.276 2.294 3.291 1.001 5000 
support 2014 -0.588 0.020 -0.627 -0.589 -0.548 1.001 5000 
unemployment 
2015 -1.557 0.688 -2.932 -1.554 -0.191 1.001 5000 
GDP growth -1.165 0.425 -1.992 -1.167 -0.329 1.001 5000 
inflation 0.993 2.288 -3.491 1.009 5.413 1.001 5000 
meandepartments 98.2 17.9 63.8 98.2 133.5 1.001 5000 
departments 5.80 1.07 4.10 5.65 8.24 1.001 5000 
municipalities 8.21 0.20 7.83 8.21 8.62 1.001 5000 
Deviance 6061 7.53 6048 6060 6078 1.001 5000 
Note: Results from the model with the highest R2 at the level of municipalities y and 
departments a. To include inflation as a predictor, the model included only 22 
departments and the capital district. Different intercepts a were estimated, 
identified by the name of each department. Coefficients of predictors that help 
explain variance in the dependent variable are shown in bold.  = linear coeffi-
cient of the corresponding variable, ESS = estimated sampling size of the pos-
terior, HPD = high probability density, PSRF = potential scale reduction factor, 
 = standard deviation of the posterior of the corresponding parameter. 
4 Discussion 
Our analyses evaluated the effects on support for the initial peace ac-
cords of both conventional electoral factors (such as support for the 
incumbent party, unemployment, economic growth and inflation) and 
violence-related variables relevant to inclusion models (such as victims of 
violence and displacement). The results reveal: (1) important regional 
differences in baseline support for the accords, (2) the importance of 
economic performance in determining referendum outcomes, (3) the 
critical role of support for former president Álvaro Uribe’s Centro 
Democrático party in explaining votes against the accords, and (4) the 
tendency for municipalities with proportionally more victims of violence 
to vote for the peace accords. While the last two have been highlighted 
before (e.g., Álvarez-Vanegas, Garzón, and Bernal 2016), these effects 
had not been estimated in a formal model or analyzed together with 
variables explaining electoral behavior. We examine each of these key 
findings, along with the implications for implementation of the revised 
peace accords. 
  
  110 E. Dávalos, L. F. Morales, J. S. Holmes, and L. M. Dávalos 
 
4.1 Regional Variation 
First, the estimates of department-specific intercepts in the main model 
(Table 3) reveal regional differences in baseline support for the peace 
accords (that is, not associated with municipal predictors, but influenced 
by the department-level factors). This variation tends to reflect differ-
ences between an Andean core of municipalities with low support the 
peace accords, and higher support in the periphery, with some excep-
tions (Figure 1a). Densely populated Andean departments such as Quin-
dio and Risaralda had low intercepts, as did Norte de Santander (north-
east) and Valle del Cauca (southwest), reflecting results from their more 
densely populated Andean municipalities. Additionally, the results sup-
port a critical role for the Caribbean region: Bolivar, Magdalena, Sucre 
and Cordoba, all in the Caribbean region, show some of the highest 
intercepts in the model, and only one Caribbean department, Cesar, 
showed low support for the accords (Table 3). Since the region as a 
whole tended to disproportionately vote for the accords, low voter turn-
out caused by heavy rains and flooding from Tropical Storm Matthew 
ultimately contributed to rejection of the accords on the aggregate. The 
regional divide, along with the contrast in voting patterns between An-
dean and non-Andean municipalities within departments (Figure 1), 
suggest implementing the accords will require location-specific policies 
to persuade voters in more densely populated municipalities of the bene-
fits of the renewed peace accords. 
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Figure 1. Variation across Municipalities 
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Figure 2. Municipality-Level Factors 
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Figure 3. Department-Level Factors 
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4.2 Covariates of Referendum Results by  
Department 
While previous analyses of the Colombian referendum have highlighted 
subnational variation and the effect of measures of violence on the vote, 
none have included standard economic factors relevant to electoral stud-
ies. Despite low power from the small sample of departments included 
in the model, we found negative effects of both unemployment and 
GDP growth on support for the accords (Figure 3). As expected based 
on previous work showing unemployment decreases incumbent support, 
higher unemployment rates translated into lower support for the peace 
accords, contributing to low intercepts in departments such as Quindio 
and Norte de Santander. In contrast, the Caribbean region also experi-
enced relatively low unemployment, helping explain higher overall inter-
cepts (Table 3). More puzzling is the negative effect of GDP growth on 
support for the accords, as growth generally results in support for the 
incumbent government (Holmes and Gutiérrez De Piñeres 2012). This 
effect is driven, at least in part, by declining GDP in departments such as 
Bolivar and Chocó, and stronger growth in Antioquia and Cesar. It may 
also reflect the varying resource basis of the different regions, with Boli-
var being more heavily reliant on oil refining during a period of low 
global prices, and Antioquia reflecting both the gold mining boom and 
industrial growth of a more diversified local economy. 
4.3 Covariates of Referendum Results by  
Municipality  
Support for the incumbent party is an important control variable in most 
electoral studies. However, in order to understand the rejection of the 
referendum, we look to support for the party strongly associated with a 
rejection of the peace plan. The crucial role of support for former presi-
dent Álvaro Uribe’s Centro Democrático party as an opposition force 
has been noted before (Álvarez-Vanegas, Garzón, and Bernal 2016), but 
the extent of this effect relative to other factors has not. As shown in our 
model, support for Centro Democrático is a strong predictor of the 
“no”-voting pattern in the referendum (Table 3). This raises the question 
of how the opposition, or the government for that matter, mobilized 
voters around a single referendum question. In contrast with the 1990 
referendum on forming a new constitutional assembly, which was issued 
alongside parliamentary elections (Álvarez-Vanegas, Garzón, and Bernal 
2016; Fox, Gallón-Giraldo, and Stetson 2010), the 2016 peace referen-
  Colombian Peace Referendum Results 115
 

 
dum was a stand-alone single-issue vote. While the government spent 
considerable resources publicizing the referendum and the benefits of 
the peace accords, how the opposition mobilized is less well understood. 
In fact, pre-referendum survey polls systematically overestimated the 
pro-accords vote (in August 2016, 57 percent reported preferring dia-
logue and peace talks to a military solution according to Gallup 2016a), 
contributing to the difficulty in explaining voter mobilization by the 
opposition. Nevertheless, our results show the widespread mobilization 
of opposition voters had a strong and consequential effect on the vote.  
In the lead-up to the referendum, Centro Democrático representa-
tives led opposition to the peace accords, with vocal support from for-
mer president and then-senator Alvaro Uribe. The formal rationale for 
opposing the accords centered on the transitional justice process for 
both Colombian military implicated in crimes and FARC combatants. 
Centro Democrático argued that the transitional justice process would be 
biased against the military and lenient towards the FARC combatants.  
Another broadly publicized line of opposition centered on transi-
tional economic support for ex-combatants. As part of the peace ac-
cords, FARC ex-combatants were to receive 90 percent of the minimum 
wage for up to 24 months, provided they were not otherwise employed. 
Two other single-time payments, the first as a one-time stipend follow-
ing the unemployment period, and the second in support of small busi-
ness, were also contemplated. Released in August, these terms prompted 
outrage that was aired vocally through social media and in the comment 
sections of articles reporting the news (COLPRENSA 2016). With un-
employment over 6 percent (Figure 3), a vast population of underem-
ployed and informally employed workers, and no unemployment insur-
ance, commenters were indignant about the system to reward ex-
combatants who were portrayed by the opposition as no different from 
criminals or bandits. Partially reflecting concerns surrounding the stipend 
program, our analyses show that greater unemployment resulted in lower 
support for the accords (Figure 3).  
However, the informal arguments against the peace extended well 
beyond the actual text of the accords. Headed by Uribe, opposition to 
the accords coalesced into a loose civil coalition animated by different 
political aims. These included the rejection by both conservative Catho-
lics and evangelical Christians of the principles of equal gender rights 
presented in the accords. To mobilize this voter base, Centro Demo-
crático called for congressional hearings based on a social media cam-
paign that falsely equated a never-released leaflet on gender diversity 
aimed at schoolchildren with photography stills from online pornogra-
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phy. In the hearings, Centro Democrático representatives and allies ques-
tioned the openly gay Minister of Education Gina Parody, time and again 
conflating online pornography with the unpublished leaflet. Concurrent-
ly, and led by clergy and some educators, thousands of parents marched 
in August against what was described as “homosexual colonization of 
the classrooms”. This placed Parody, and by extension the sitting execu-
tive and the peace accords, on the defensive. In the run-up to the refer-
endum the leaflet was presented as one example of “gender ideology” to 
be imposed if the accords were ratified, and Parody resigned two days 
after the referendum (Educación 2016). Uribe and his Centro Demo-
crático successfully shifted attention from the potential benefits of the 
peace, energizing their voter base despite overwhelming mainstream 
support for peace. First, Centro Democrático and its allies managed to 
connect the peace accords to socially sensitive issues, such as gender 
equality and gay rights, and defined the discussion of transitional eco-
nomic measures as rewards for FARC’s past crimes (instead of incentives 
to forego armed insurrection). On the defensive, the government fo-
cused on defending the educational campaign, without addressing the 
link to the gender and gay rights provisions in the accords. Similarly, the 
provisional stipends were first denied by official sources, then mini-
mized, but not defended on their merits for bringing about peace 
(Alsema 2016).  
In a series of now-familiar moves, the opposition successfully de-
ployed social media to promote linkages between the accords and sensi-
tive social issues by identifying terms with overwhelmingly negative, and 
often visceral connotations. These included: “Castro-chavismo”, aligning 
peace with the regimes of Cuba and Venezuela; “peace without impuni-
ty”, suggesting openness to accords while labeling the provisional justice 
clauses of the accords as impunity; “Santos’ surrender of Colombia to 
the FARC”, highlighting negotiation as a manifestation of weakness 
instead of the product of credible military gains by the government; “No 
+ Santos”, directly identifying the accords with the sitting government 
and not the culmination of a national process; “Civil Resistance”, casting 
the “no” vote as resistance and not the persistence of the status quo; and 
“Gender Ideology”, equating the idealistic gender rights clauses of the 
peace to an assault on traditional family roles (Gomez-Suarez 2016, 
2017). These terms were amplified from Uribe’s favored medium of 
Twitter, as well as through community groups on Facebook that were 
responsible, for example, for disseminating the false leaflets. In fact, 
Colombia News reported a significant amount of disinformation, with the 
“no” proponents carrying out a particularly effective social media cam-
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paign (Alsema 2016). In a close parallel with electoral surprises such as 
the Brexit vote and the US 2016 presidential elections, the Colombian 
government’s approach relied on public service announcements and 
standard media outlets, as well as polling surveys that missed growing 
mobilization of the “no” vote through social media. Juan C. Vélez, the 
CEO of the “no” campaign, outlined the winning strategy as a combina-
tion of social media virality and mobilizing anger so that people “go out 
and be pissed off when they vote” (La República 2016). In line with the 
bias in spending found in electoral studies (Vreese 2006), and as Vélez 
boasted only a few days after the referendum, the winning operation 
turned out to be inexpensive despite being backed by powerful corporate 
donors (La República 2016). 
Finally, and as expected under inclusion models, municipalities with 
more per-capita victims of conflict tended to vote for peace. Although 
the pattern was identified early on (Álvarez-Vanegas, Garzón, and Bernal 
2016), suggesting the experience of violence motivated support for 
peace, here we show that this correlation persists after controlling for 
other relevant factors (Figure 2). Municipalities with high proportions of 
victims tend to be peripheral to the Andean core, and the maps reveal 
complementarity between high victimization rates and both rejection of 
the peace accords and support for the opposition party (Figure 1). Ab-
stention rates in peripheral municipalities were higher than in other re-
gions, leading to the suggestion that higher voter turnout in those re-
gions would have changed the outcome (Álvarez-Vanegas, Garzón, and 
Bernal 2016). As voters are concentrated in Andean municipalities, over-
coming their numerical advantage would require higher peripheral turn-
out relative to the Andean core. Municipalities that receive higher num-
bers of displaced people contrast with those with higher victimization 
rates (Figure 2). Although the strain on services and infrastructure from 
displaced arrivals is expected to result in opposition to the government 
(Carillo 2009), no such influence is apparent with these data. 
5 Conclusions 
We analyzed the Colombian referendum on peace with FARC in light of 
two broad theories: one based on inclusion in peace negotiations high-
lighting civil society participation and, in this case, exposure to political 
violence; and another based on electoral and referendum results. Alt-
hough we find support for the inclusion model, as a greater representa-
tion of victims of violence translated into support for the accords, elec-
toral and referendum-related factors provided the better guide to the 
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results. As expected based on electoral studies, support for the opposi-
tion party was a critical factor in the outcome, with more important 
quantitative influence than either the experience of victimization or eco-
nomic drivers of dissatisfaction such as the unemployment rate. We 
hypothesize that the opposition was able to mobilize its voter base 
through effective use of social media, connecting the peace accords to 
socially divisive discussions on gender difference and recasting financial 
incentives for peace as unjust rewards. Important regional differences, 
with higher relative support for the peace in most Caribbean depart-
ments, imply the heavy rains and flooding from Tropical Storm Mat-
thew, which suppressed turnout in the region, may have had a decisive 
effect on the referendum result. After controlling for both regional dif-
ferences and other variables, the per capita rate of victimization was a 
positive covariate of support for the accords, likely reflecting greater 
motivation to seek peace. Finally, the Colombian case provides addition-
al support in the referendum literature for the power of the status quo, 
especially in the context of uncertainty created by an animated opposi-
tion and in a country without recent referendum experience. 
Although there will not be another referendum on the peace pro-
cess with the FARC, support for the process can increase, especially with 
alterations to the details of the implementation, benefits to the demobi-
lized, and punishments for FARC crimes. In the Danish case, a 1992 
rejection of the Maastricht Treaty was followed by acceptance in 1993, 
driven by changing perceptions of the costs and benefits of integration 
among a small group of swing voters (Siune and Svensson 1993). Even-
tually, a revised accord was unanimously passed in the Colombian case, 
by 75 to 0. Uribe’s Centro Democrático boycotted the vote. In fact, after 
the defeat, the Colombian peace process polled stronger than three 
months before rebounding to 73 percent, up from 57 percent in August 
(Álvarez-Vanegas, Garzón, and Bernal 2016; Gallup 2016a).  
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El Apoyo a la Oposición y la Experiencia de Violencia Explican 
los Resultados del Plebiscito por la Paz en Colombia 
Resumen: ¿Qué factores llevaron a la derrota sorpresiva del plebiscito 
por la paz en Colombia? Aunque los análisis iniciales encontraron cone-
xiones entre el apoyo por la paz y la experiencia de violencia, las condi-
ciones económicas y el apoyo a los partidos en el poder también afecta-
ron tales resultados electorales. En este artículo utilizamos modelos je-
rárquicos bayesianos para evaluar las conexiones entre los resultados del 
plebiscito y la experiencia previa de victimización, las condiciones eco-
nómicas, y el apoyo al Centro Democrático (el partido político opositor 
al acuerdo de paz principal). Hubo menos apoyo por la paz en la zona 
andina comparada con otras regiones, y los departamentos con menos 
apoyo tuvieron mayor desempleo y crecimiento del PIB. A pesar que la 
experiencia previa de victimización aumentó la proporción de votos por 
la paz, el apoyo a la oposición fue la covariante dominante en el descen-
so en el apoyo por los acuerdos de paz. Teniendo en cuenta estos resul-
tados, la fuerte variación regional en la línea base de apoyo a los acuerdos 
– una variable compleja gobernada por el grado de compromiso político, 
pero también influenciada por factores económicos estructurales – será 
crítica en la implementación de los nuevos acuerdos. 
Palabras clave: Colombia, bayesiano, procesos de paz, plebiscito 
 
